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The Effect of Enclave Residence on the 
Labour Force Activities of Immigrants in Canada 
 
It has been well documented that immigrants’ clustering of residence in large cities has been 
associated with the creation of a number of ethnic enclaves. The intensive exposure to own-
ethnic population could affect immigrant labour market involvement positively or negatively. 
However, no extant Canadian research has provided empirical evidence on the sign of these 
enclave effects. In this paper, I use the 1981-2001 Censuses to estimate the impact of 
residence in ethnic enclaves on male immigrants’ labour force participation rate and 
employment probability. For recent immigrants who arrived in Canada within the preceding 
ten years, the intensity of enclave residence is negatively associated with their labour force 
participation rate, but positively related to their employment probability in all censuses. 
However, living in an enclave has no significant effect on the labour force activity of older 
immigrants who have lived in Canada for more than twenty years. Since immigrants could be 
attracted to areas with more job opportunities and hence enlarge the size of an enclave, the 
estimated effects from probit regressions might be positively biased. I then use instrumental 
variable (IV) method to address this endogeneity problem, and the IV estimates are 
consistent with the probit regression results. 
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1   Introduction 
Canada is one of the world's largest host countries for immigrants. According to 
the 2006 Census, about one fifth of the Canadian population are foreign born. Given the 
importance of immigrants’ labour market performance to the health of Canadian economy, 
there has been an abundance of research on immigrant earnings and their convergence 
with those of native-born Canadians, a process known as assimilation. Baker and 
Benjamin (1994) and Bloom et al. (1995) find that immigrants who arrived in the 1970s 
have low entry earnings and low assimilation rates, and that immigrants cannot catch up 
in earnings with the native-born. Hum and Simpson (2000), Frenette and Morisette (2003) 
and Gray et al. (2003) update the literature using more recently available data. They still 
do not observe evidence of assimilation during the 1990s, in spite of new immigrants’ 
rising educational attainment.   
In addition to earnings, it is equally important to study immigrant labour force 
activities, because the prerequisite of earnings assimilation is to participate in the labour 
force and be employed. However, according to the Canadian censuses, young and recent 
immigrants have lower labour market involvement than old and earlier cohorts (as shown 
in Section 3). Additionally, after the 1987 policy change that skilled workers no longer 
required a pre-arranged job position to apply for permanent residence, the average 
number of landing immigrants drastically increased to over 200,000 per year with a large 
proportion from Asian countries such as China, India and Pakistan. Owing to the 
increasing diversity in ethnic and cultural background of immigrants, it is reasonable to 
expect their labour force attachment to change.   
An enclave is a minority foreign-born ethnic or cultural group living as an entity   4
within the territory of the host country. It is well documented by economists, for example 
Balakrishnan and Hou (1999), Hou and Picot (2003) and Warman (2007), that immigrants 
in Canada, like those in other major host countries, tend to cluster in areas that have a large 
stock of immigrants with the same ethnicity, and build up their enclaves: examples would 
be China Town or the Jewish community in Toronto. There are many reasons for 
immigrants to live in enclaves. Bartel (1989) suggests that new immigrants usually favour 
a city that serves as the port of entry, hosts a great intensity of co-ethnic immigrants, and 
provides more job opportunities. Historically, the port city factor is crucial in the 
establishment of an enclave, while co-ethnicity and job opportunities become more 
important during its development.  
An enclave provides immigrants with social networks and ethnic goods at low cost. 
By speaking a common language, immigrants in enclaves can quickly build up networks, 
and share knowledge about living and working in the host country. Moreover, immigrants 
from non-traditional source countries have brought a wide variety of food, clothes and even 
holidays that are different from the Canadian tradition. Chiswick and Miller (2002) term 
the goods and services that are only consumed by some specific ethnic groups and not by 
natives as “ethnic goods”. Due to economies of scale, the average cost of providing ethnic 
goods may decrease when the size of the ethnic group in an area grows. As a result, the 
price of ethnic goods may be more competitive in a large ethnic enclave than in a small one. 
Given the particularity of immigrants’ residential behaviour, researchers try to 
explore the effect of living in an ethnic enclave on immigrant earnings using data from 
Canada (Warman 2007), the U.S. (Borjas 2000, Chiswick and Miller 2002, and 
Chowdhury and Pedace 2007) and Europe (Clark and Drinkwater 2002 and Edin et al.   5
2003). However, there is little research on the relationship between immigrant residential 
segregation and their labour force attachment. Hou and Picot (2003) briefly touch upon 
this question in a study on ethnic enclaves using the 1981-1996 Canadian Censuses. They 
conclude that the correlation between the intensity of own-ethnicity neighbours and an 
immigrant’s probability of employment is negative but statistically insignificant in most 
cases. Since they sample the three largest visible minority groups, namely Chinese, South 
Asian and Black, in Toronto, Montreal and Vancouver, their findings represent only part 
of the complete picture. Extensive research on more ethnic groups across the whole 
country is required to obtain a broader view. In order to fill this knowledge gap, I use a 
sample of all major ethnic groups in Canada to analyze the impact of enclave residence 
on immigrant labour force participation rate and employment likelihood. 
This paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a literature review. In 
Section 3, I describe the data and conduct a cross tabulation analysis. The basic 
econometric model of immigrant labour force activities is outlined in Section 4 and the 
regression results are presented. Section 5 explains the complications of the econometric 
model, and provides a solution to the problem. The final section concludes. 
 
2  Literature on Ethnic Enclaves 
Economic research often uses residential segregation and ethnic network to 
explain the development of immigrant earnings and employment. However, the direction 
of the effect of enclave residence is undetermined.   
On the one hand, the demand for ethnic goods in large enclaves provides business 
opportunities and hence directly increases the demand for immigrant workers with   6
ethnic-specific skills. One important incentive for immigrants to work in these ethnic 
companies is that in most cases, they are not required to possess the abilities specific to 
success in Canadian labour market, such as proficiency in official languages. In this way, 
enclave residence may increase the odds for their initial survival in the labour market. As 
evidence, Borjas (1986) finds that immigrants have higher self-employment rates than 
natives due to the “enclave effects”. In addition, an indirect positive effect comes from 
the social network that is readily available to new residents in ethnic enclaves. 
Immigrants, no matter how proficient in official languages, can benefit from the job 
information obtained through the ethnic network. Goel and Lang (2009) study the effect 
of social ties on immigrant job search using data from the Longitudinal Survey of 
Immigrants to Canada (LSIC). They find that the job arrival rate is faster for immigrants 
who are closely tied to their network. 
On the other hand, enclave residence could also have a negative effect on 
immigrant labour market performance. When the size of an enclave grows, more 
unassimilated immigrants enter the enclave and compete with existing immigrants for 
jobs in ethnic companies. An ethnic company may then possess monopsonistic power 
against those who lack the host-country-specific skills. To maximize its profit, the 
company is likely to hire fewer workers and pay less than in a competitive labour market. 
Moreover, enclaves may segregate immigrants from the mainstream and reduce their 
incentive to acquire Canadian-specific skills. Lazear (1999) discovers a negative 
correlation between living in minority language enclaves and improvement of proficiency 
in official languages for immigrants in the U.S., and Chiswick and Miller (2002) find 
similar results using Canadian data. When immigrants living in ethnic enclaves do not   7
accumulate as many language skills as those living outside, their work experience and 
other human capital may not be easily transferable into productivity in the host country. 
In this way, enclave residents’ job opportunities are largely restricted within the confines 
of ethnic firms, and their employment likelihood outside enclaves then becomes very low. 
Given the pros and cons of enclave residence, its net effect on immigrant labour 
market involvement is theoretically ambiguous. Therefore, a number of researchers 
attempt to address this question by empirical approaches. Studies using U.S. data have 
shown a negative relationship between enclaves and immigrant wage assimilation. Borjas 
(2000) measures enclave by ethnic segregation and finds that male immigrants’ residence 
in enclaves harms their wage growth. Chiswick and Miller (2002) use the concentration 
of home languages to measure enclave intensity and find negative effect on earnings as 
well. Warman (2007) applies Borjas’s (2000) method to the 1981–2001 Canadian Census 
data and obtains a similar result.   
Unlike earnings, research on other aspects of immigrant labour market outcomes 
does not yield pessimistic results. For example, Balakrishnan and Hou (1999) find a 
weakening correlation between residential and occupational segregation by ethnicity 
during the 1980s. Although immigrants still tend to live in enclaves, they become more 
likely to work in higher social status occupations. According to Hou and Picot’s (2003) 
research, the effects of enclave residence at the census tract level on immigrant 
employment and occupational segregation vary across ethnic groups. For example, living 
in an own-ethnicity intensive neighbourhood lowers a black immigrant’s likelihood of 
being employed and increases his probability of working in an ethnically segregated 
occupation, whereas the effect is not statistically significant in either way for a Chinese   8
immigrant. These studies provide an alternative angle of analyzing immigrant enclave 
residence and labour market assimilation. 
 
3  Data and Statistical Summary 
The datasets that I use in this paper are drawn from the 1981, 1986, 1991, 1996 
and 2001 Canadian Census Public Use Microdata File (PUMF). I restrict my sample to 
male immigrants aged 25-54 who are not born in an English or French speaking 
developed country. Thus, those born in the U.S., the U.K., Ireland, Australia, New 
Zealand and France are excluded due to their similarity to native-born Canadians in terms 
of languages and culture. I focus my study on males only because female labour supply is 
usually complicated by their roles in non-market work at home. The age restriction is set 
to the primary working ages in order to exclude individuals who are pursuing 
postsecondary education and those who are eligible for early retirement during the survey 
year. I also drop observations of Atlantic Provinces and the Territories because of the 
small representation of immigrants in these areas. All wages and earnings are deflated by 
Consumer Price Index (CPI) based on the 1992 Canadian dollar. 
Descriptive statistics show that younger immigrants perform worse than older 
ones. I plot the age profile of immigrant participation rate and employment rate relative to 
same-aged natives by birth-year group in Figures 1 and 2. Immigrants born before 1951 
have higher participation and employment rates than natives (that is, their relative rates 
are positive in the figures), while those born after 1951 are worse off than natives. Figure 
3 and 4 present the immigrant- native differences in labour force activities by immigrant 
arrival cohort. Immigrants who arrived more recently, say after 1980, have lower relative   9
participation and employment rates than those who migrated before 1980. However, as 
recent cohorts’ time in Canada increases, their relative labour force activities tend to 
converge with the earlier cohorts. The fact that older and earlier immigrants perform 
better than younger and more recent cohorts implies assimilation through the 
improvement of labour market attachment.   
 
3.1  How to Measure Ethnic Enclave? 
I measure the ethnic enclaves by an exposure index that is commonly used in this 
type of literature (Borjas 2000 and Warman 2007). Let M be the number of immigrants 
and P the total population. The exposure index of enclave is then the share of population 
in a census metropolitan area (CMA) c that belongs to an ethnicity j: 
ENCLAVE = Mcj/Pc 
I include both men and women of all work statuses and all ages to calculate the 
index, because each person’s human capital and activity, regardless of his or her own 
labour market activity, can help construct the ethnic economy and network in an enclave 
and, in turn, affect a resident’s labour force activities.   
The geographic area is defined by CMA because the social network between 
immigrants and their ethnic groups largely depends on their mobility. According to 
Warman (2007), on the one hand, bus and subway services provide immigrants with a 
means of low-cost transportation within a city. On the other hand, the distance between 
CMAs is large enough to make intercity commuting relatively inconvenient. Moreover, 
new immigrants often build up their network through the use of public services or 
immigrant-assistance programs, such as libraries or language training programs. Since   10
most of these programs are provided and manipulated at the city level, it is reasonable to 
assume that immigrants usually interact with ethnic friends within a CMA. Although 
census tract is sometimes more accurate in measuring the neighbourhood characteristics 
(Hou and Picot 2003), it is too strong of an assumption that immigrants interact more 
with their neighbours than with friends living in a distant community of the same city. 
Table 1 lists enclaves with the highest exposure index in the 2001 Census by 
ethnicity and CMA. Toronto is the largest host city of ethnic enclaves, followed by 
Montreal and Vancouver. The economic environment in these cities may be one reason 
for immigrants to reside there. Besides, Vancouver magnetizes immigrants from Asia by 
its mild weather and vicinity of the Pacific Ocean. As discussed before, the large stock of 
existing immigrants in these cities then attract more immigrants from the same country of 
origin. Except for a few traditional source countries like Germany and Italy, immigrants 
from the new source countries, such as China, India and the Philippines have established 
most of the large ethnic enclaves. Due to the cultural and economic differences between 
these developing countries and Canada, immigrants from there are likely to cluster 
together and form a shelter against cultural shock. Limited by data availability, it is not 
possible to track all ethnicities from 1981 to 2001. However, an intercensal comparison 
of ethnic groups shows that Arab, Chinese, Filipino, Italian, and Portuguese enclaves 
continuously rank high in the list of exposure indices. 
 
3.2  Who Are More Likely to Live in Ethnic Enclaves? 
As discussed in the previous sections, there are a variety of reasons for 
immigrants to live in ethnic enclaves. Although a detailed analysis is beyond the range of   11
this paper, I use a statistical summary to illustrate immigrant residential distribution.   
Table 2 reports the distribution of enclave residence by immigrant 
socio-economic characteristics. I order the exposure index for immigrants from 
non-English or French speaking countries and divide them into three equal-sized groups. 
The lowest one third are called small enclave, and the highest one third are called large 
enclave. I then calculate the share of immigrants living in each enclave group by their 
socio-economic characteristics. For example, the first number in the row “High School 
Graduates” is equal to the number of immigrants with a high school diploma living in a 
small enclave divided by the total number of immigrant high school graduates. Therefore, 
the sum of each row in a census panel is 1. I omit age, marital status and naturalized 
citizenship, because they do not seem to vary across enclave groups. 
Immigrants whose years-since-migration (YSM) is more than 20 may have a high 
level of assimilation and their share of large enclave residents is lower than 30 percent in 
most censuses. By contrast, the most recent cohort who arrived in Canada within 10 years 
is more likely to live in large enclaves, and the likelihood turns as high as 40 percent in 
2001. However, it does not necessarily mean that these immigrants have moved out of 
enclaves, because the exposure index can be lowered when the population in a CMA 
grows faster than the enclave size. 
Traditionally, it is the less-educated immigrants who are more likely to live in 
ethnic enclaves. In 1986, about 40 percent immigrants with less than high school 
education choose large enclaves, whereas over 40 percent postgraduate immigrants live in 
small enclaves. However, during the 1990s, the large inflow of skilled-worker immigrants 
from Asia has substantially changed the pattern; their high educational attainment and   12
preference over large enclaves have raised the proportion of university degree holders 
living in large enclaves to 40 percent and that of postgraduates to 34 percent in 2001.   
Knowledge of one of the official languages does not seem to be correlated with 
immigrant residential decision. However, those who cannot speak either one of the 
official languages tend to live in large enclaves. 
 
3.3  How Do Enclave Residents Perform? 
Table 3 compares the labour market performance of immigrants by the 
distribution of enclave residence. Means of natives and immigrants from English or 
French speaking developed countries are listed for reference. For example, the first 
number in the “Employed” row is the proportion of immigrants living in small enclaves 
who are employed. The sum of employed, unemployed and not in labour force is equal to 
1 in each column.   
In most census years, the share of employed is not very different between small 
and large enclaves. However, those living in large enclaves have lower participation rates 
and are less likely to be unemployed than those in small enclaves. Overall, enclave 
residence does not seem to improve immigrants’ labour force involvement relative to 
natives.  
Immigrants in large enclaves earn less than those in small enclaves. However, the 
disparity in annual wages and earnings shrinks over time, partially due to the increasing 
share of high-skilled immigrants living in large enclaves.   
Interestingly, the proportion of large enclave residents working in the same 
Census Sub-Division (CSD) is even lower than those in a small enclave. This has two   13
implications: (a) living in a large enclave may provide an immigrant with information 
about job opportunities beyond its geographic confinement; (b) considering immigrants’ 
high dwelling-owning ratios, it may be difficult for them to move close to the place of 
work. If residents in large enclaves are less mobile than those in small enclaves, the effect 
of job opportunities on residence decision, that could cause endogeneity problem in the 
multivariate regression analysis, is moderate. Since CSD is a smaller geographic area 
than CMA and the majority of people stay in the same CSD as five years ago, it is safe to 
say that most immigrants choose to live in the same enclave over a long period of time.   
In summary, recently arrived immigrants are more likely to live in large ethnic 
enclaves on arriving in Canada, but they do not seem to fare better than those outside 
enclaves in terms of labour market involvement and earnings. However, the cross-tabular 
analysis is based on simple descriptive statistics without controlling for observable 
socio-economic characteristics. In order to accurately estimate the effect of enclave 
residence, I need to use multivariate regression methods. 
 
4  Basic Model and Results 
4.1  Model Specification 
I use a probit model to estimate the effect of enclaves on immigrants’ labour force 
activities. I include male immigrants who are in their primary working age in the labour 
force participation model, while only those employed and unemployed are sampled in the 
employment model. For each census year t, I run the following regression: 
Prob(Yit) = f(ENCLAVEcjt, YSMk, Xit)   14
where Y is a binary variable indicating an immigrant’s labour force activity, that is, Y 
equals one for a participant in the labour force participation model and for an employed 
man in the employment model, and zero otherwise. As defined in the previous section, 
ENCLAVEcj is the exposure index of immigrants with ethnicity j living in CMA c. In 
addition to regressions with the continuous enclave index, I use a dummy indicating a 
large enclave whose exposure index is greater than 0.02 which is roughly the 67 
percentile (or two thirds). This enclave dummy allows me to estimate the threshold effect 
of enclave residence at the cut-off level
1. YSM is a vector of dummies indicating the 
immigrant years-since-migration group that captures the assimilation effect because 
immigrants who arrive earlier may have higher labour market attachment than new 
arrivals. The three YSM groups are 21 years and more (the default), 11 to 20 years, and 
10 years and less. In the regressions, I interact either continuous or discrete measure of 
enclave with YSM to test the effect at different stages of assimilation.   
In the above equation, X is a series of socio-economic characteristic variables, 
including age, education, province, marital status, visible minority status and knowledge 
of official languages. In the labour force participation model, I add a dummy indicating 
the presence of at least one unmarried child because it can affect a person’s participation 
decision in two ways: on the one hand, a child will increase the father’s opportunity cost 
of time and the preference over leisure that, in turn, will reduce the participation rate. On 
the other hand, the presence of a child will also increase the budget constraint and 
motivate the father to participate in the labour market. Additionally, eligibility of 
childcare tax benefits can increase a parent’s after-tax income and also provide an 
                                                        
1  I have also used discrete enclave index by dividing the index into a series of equal-width bands and using a 
vector of dummies to indicate them. Regression results show that only enclaves with an index higher than 0.02 have 
significant coefficient estimates.   15
incentive to participate. Likewise, in the employment model, I include naturalized 
citizenship as a control variable, because Canadian citizenship will give a candidate some 
priority in obtaining government jobs. 
 
4.2  Regression Results of the Labour Force Participation Model 
To simplify the interpretation of the probit regression results of male immigrant 
labour force participation, I calculate and report the marginal effects of the independent 
variables in this section. In all regressions, the control variables
2  have expected signs, for 
example, the most recent immigrants whose YSM is 10 years and less have a 
significantly lower probability of participation than those who arrived 20 years ago. The 
age group variables show that the participation rate peaks at the age 30-39, and 
immigrants with higher education are more likely to participate. Compared to Ontario, 
only immigrants living in Quebec have a significantly lower participation rate. Those 
who cannot speak either official language and who belong to visible minority have a 
lower rate, but marriage and the presence of a child have positive effects on participation.   
I highlight the estimated marginal effects of the enclave index and its interaction 
with YSM in Table 4. The enclave index is statistically insignificant in 1991 and before, 
but it turns significantly negative as of 1996. The marginal effect in 1996 means a 1 
percentage point increase in the exposure index will lower the participation rate of 
immigrants living in the enclave by about 0.44 percent. Such an effect is moderate, 
because the average enclave index is about 1.5 percent whereas the participation rate 
ranges between 90 and 95 percent. In the lower panel of Table 4, I interact the enclave 
                                                        
2  The estimates of the control variables are omitted, but they are available upon request.   16
index with YSM groups; the marginal effects of enclave residence then vary over time for 
immigrants whose YSM is 11-20 years and less than 10 years. Before 1991, there are 
some positive effects of enclave residence on labour force participation, but the effect 
becomes mainly significantly negative in 1996 and 2001. For those who arrived in 
Canada 20 years before the observation year, the effect of enclave residence is always 
statistically insignificant.   
Table 5 reports the regression results with models using a dummy to indicate 
residence in a large enclave. In the regressions without interaction, almost all the 
marginal effects of the enclave dummy are statistically insignificant, except for 1991 
where they are significantly positive. When the enclave dummy is interacted with the 
YSM variables, the results are mostly insignificant, as shown in the lower panel of Table 
5. In 1996 and 2001, the signs of the large enclaves are mainly negative and insignificant. 
In general, the small magnitude of the estimated effects and their lack of significance 
suggest that there is no evidence of a threshold effect, and that immigrants who live in 
large enclaves do not have a substantially higher labour force participation rate than those 
who live outside. Even the significant estimate in 1991 implies merely a 1.6 percentage 
point difference in participation rate between large and small enclaves. 
 
4.3  Regression Results of the Employment Model 
I then restrict my sample to labour force participants and use the indicator of 
immigrant employment status as the dependent variable in the probit regressions. It 
should be noted that since only labour force participants are sampled in this model, the 
regression results can be treated as an inverse effect on immigrants’ unemployment rate.   17
The estimated marginal effects of enclave variables are presented in Table 6 and 7. 
Similar to the participation model, estimates of the control variables in this model all 
have expected signs.   
In the upper panel of Table 6, the marginal effects of the exposure index are 
positive and significant in all years except for 1981. To illustrate the effects, I use 
enclaves of Indian immigrants as an example. From Part B of Table 1, the enclave index 
for Indians in Vancouver is 4.71 percent while that in Hamilton is 1.28 percent in 2001. 
Given the estimated marginal effect of 0.183 in Table 6, an Indian immigrant in 
Vancouver is more likely to be employed than his compatriot in Hamilton by about 0.6 
percentage point [=(4.71% – 1.28%)*0.183]. I then interact the exposure index with YSM 
groups and the marginal effects of the interacted terms are shown in the lower panel of 
the table. There seems to be inverse relationship between the effect of enclave index and 
immigrants’ time in the host country. Since 1986, the marginal effect is significantly 
positive for the two more recent cohorts whose YSM is below 20, and is strongest for 
those who arrived in Canada within 10 years. For the earliest cohort, the effect turns 
statistically insignificant and small in magnitude. Estimates of the interacted variables 
suggest that it is the new immigrants who substantially benefit from enclave residence in 
terms of employment probability.   
In Table 7, results from regressions where a large enclave dummy is used instead 
of a continuous enclave index show a similar pattern. The marginal effects of living in a 
large enclave are all positive and significant when the YSM-specific effect is not 
controlled for. However, when interacted with YSM groups, they diminish to zero for 
immigrants with more than 20 years in Canada, but remain significantly positive for those   18
whose YSM is 10 and less. Take the 1996 Census for example: the estimated effect for 
the recent immigrants is 0.028, which implies that those living in a large enclave have a 
higher employment probability than those in small enclaves by nearly 3 percentage points. 
The differential is substantial if viewed from the unemployment side. Since the enclave 
dummy provides a test for the threshold effect of living in large enclaves, it is not 
surprising to show stronger impact on immigrant employment probability than the 
continuous exposure index.   
In summary, probit regression results have shown evidence of immigrant 
assimilation in labour market involvement because new immigrants have lower 
participation and employment probabilities than earlier cohorts. There is an inverse 
relationship between the magnitude of the effect of enclave residence on immigrant 
labour force activity and their years-since-migration: the later the arrival cohort, the 
stronger the impact. For immigrants whose YSM is over 20 years, there is almost no 
significant correlation between enclave and their labour force activity. However, for new 
immigrants who arrive within 10 years, enclave residence significantly lowers their 
labour force participation rate, but it significantly increases the participants’ probability of 
being employed. 
The causal relationship may seem doubtful when I regress the labour force 
activities on the contemporary enclave index. Considering the long time that it takes for 
an enclave to be established and developed while an immigrant’s labour force activity is a 
relatively short-term status, it is reasonable to assume that the labour market outcome is 
affected by the ethnic enclaves rather than the inverse. However, it should be noted that in 
the long run, labour market performance of existing immigrants could influence the   19
enclave size, or they could be both affected by some unobserved factors. These 
complications will be discussed in the following section. 
 
5  Endogeneity of Enclave Variables and IV Regressions 
Although the enclave size and intensity are not directly affected by the current 
labour market outcomes of immigrants, the probit regression results are not necessarily 
free from biases because immigrants may not choose residential location randomly. In 
addition to the easily accessible social network and low-cost ethnic goods, immigrants 
may also base their residential decisions on job opportunities and expected earnings in a 
city. The non-random geographic distribution of immigrants will have two complications 
on the probit regression analysis. First, it is possible that an immigrant who lacks the 
skills or ability specific to labour market success in the host-country tends to seek an 
enclave as an asylum, whereas an ambitious and self-motivated immigrant may be 
indifferent between living in an enclave and living outside. Since those unambitious and 
unmotivated enclave residents are less likely to participate or to be employed than those 
ambitious non-enclave residents, the estimated effect of enclave residence on immigrant 
labour force involvement may be negatively biased in a probit regression. Second, the 
size of an enclave may be endogenous to local labour market conditions. Suppose that 
immigrants are attracted to large cities, like Toronto and Vancouver, by the optimal 
economic conditions and substantial labour demand there. They will then build and 
develop ethnic enclaves in these cities. Although this process could take decades, the 
positive correlation between enclave size and job opportunities in an area would bias the 
probit estimates of enclave residence upwards.     20
There is no unanimously accepted solution to this endogeneity problem. For 
example, Borjas (2000) argues that his potentially biased regression results provide a 
lower limit on the adverse impact of enclave residence on earning growth, and that the 
real effect could be even more negative. Edin et al. (2003) use the enclave size in the base 
year as an instrument for the size of the current enclave in which a refugee immigrant 
resides. Although a standard solution is still an open question, I will propose an 
instrumental variable (IV) approach to address the bias due to the endogeneity of 
enclaves.  
An IV should be correlated with the endogenous enclave variables but 
uncorrelated with the error term of the main regression equation. An auxiliary equation 
including the IVs is regressed to predict values of enclave variable, and the fitted values 
are then used in the main regression function.   
I choose the lagged enclave exposure index and mother tongue as the IVs for 
ethnic enclaves, because these variables are hypothesized not to affect the current labour 
market outcome of immigrants, yet they may play important roles when immigrants make 
residential decisions. The lagged enclave exposure index is often used as a determinant of 
present enclave intensity because it is documented (Altonji and Card 1991) that a large 
concentration of existing immigrants attracts new immigrants with the same cultural 
background. One reason may be that an existing enclave provides them with ethnic goods 
at a relatively low price and easy access to information (Zavodny 1997, Chowdhury and 
Pedace 2006 and Maré et al. 2008). Another reason could be the need of religious people 
for frequent communication and services at some religious institutions, as suggested by 
Breton (1964). It is economically wise for them to cluster around the place of worship   21
that is built in an existing enclave. Because of the strong connection between ethnicity 
and religion groups, a church, mosque or temple will be the core of an ethnic community 
that attracts more immigrants with the same religion and hence increase the enclave size.
3 
Mother tongue, the other instrument, can be one major reason for many immigrants, 
particularly those who are not fluent in the official languages, to live in an ethnic enclave 
(Balakrishnan and Hou 1999). Since my sample is restricted to those from non-English or 
French speaking countries, heterogeneity in mother tongue is not likely correlated with 
immigrant labour market outcomes.   
I report the IV regression results of participation and employment models using 
continuous and discrete enclave measures in Table 8 and 9 respectively. Because of the 
use of lagged variables, there is no regression for the 1981 Census.   
In Table 8, the marginal effects of enclave index and large enclave dummy are 
insignificant on male immigrant labour force participation in Census 1986 and 1991. 
However, the effect turns significantly negative thereafter. For example, a 1 percentage 
point increase in enclave index lowers a male resident’s participation rate by roughly 0.4 
percentage point in 1996 and 2001. Meanwhile, estimates of enclave dummy in the lower 
panel indicate that the participation rate of an immigrant who lives in a large enclave is 
lower than someone outside by 3 percentage points. As expected, the negative effect of 
enclave is stronger than that estimated by a simple probit model.   
Table 9 presents the IV regression results of male immigrant employment models. 
The marginal effects of enclave variables are all positive and significant, and their 
magnitudes are similar to those from probit regressions. This provides strong evidence 
                                                        
3  I try to include religious status as an instrument variable in the regression, but it seems to be so highly 
collinear with the lagged enclave index that its coefficient is almost zero.     22
that immigrants benefit from enclave residence in terms of employment probability. As 
shown in the lower panel, the marginal effect of the large enclave dummy varies between 
1.3 and 3.2 percentage points over time, which can be treated as a big impact on 
unemployment. Considering the large number of new immigrants who choose to cluster 
in ethnic enclaves, they are the group who benefit most from enclave residence.   
IV regression results confirm my findings with probit models. Immigrants living 
in ethnic enclaves tend to have lower participation rate in recent years, but they have a 
better chance of being employed once in the labour force.   
 
6  Conclusion 
An ethnic enclave can provide an immigrant with social networks and job 
opportunities that suit the human capital obtained from the source country, but living in 
an enclave will also hinder the immigrant’s acquisition of host-country-specific skills. 
Therefore, the net effect of residing in an ethnic enclave on immigrant labour market 
performance is theoretically ambiguous. Many researchers attempt to disentangle the 
relationship between ethnic segregation and immigrant earnings, but no current study 
examines the effect of enclave residence on immigrant labour force activities using 
Canadian data. In this paper, I attempt to fill this gap in research through an empirical 
analysis on male immigrants using the 1981 - 2001 Canadian Censuses.   
It is found that new immigrants who arrived in Canada after 1991 are more likely 
to cluster in large ethnic enclaves for a temporary or permanent source of social network, 
whereas old immigrant cohorts tend to live outside enclaves. With the inflow of skilled 
workers from Asian countries during the 1990s, the proportion of well-educated   23
immigrants living in large enclaves has substantially increased.   
Probit and IV regressions show that enclave variables that measure the intensity 
of ethnic clustering are negatively correlated with the labour force participation rate in the 
late 1990s, but the magnitude is moderate. By interacting immigrants’ years-since- 
migration with enclave variables, I find that the impact on new immigrants’ participation 
rate is significantly negative. This finding can be explained by immigrants’ human capital 
investment and welfare participation. Aydemir’s (2009) recent study shows that refugees 
living in enclaves are more likely to invest in language or professional training than those 
living outside. One possible reason may be the relatively low costs of providing 
ethnicity-specific training services in an enclave. When there are a large number of 
immigrants who do not speak the official languages fluently, and only a limited number 
of positions offered by ethnic companies, the need for language training is then increased 
for those who want to work in non-ethnic companies. If the lower participation rate is due 
to immigrants’ investment in human capital, it is then not necessary to worry about the 
negative effect of enclave residence. Additionally, through ethnic networks, immigrants 
who are not proficient in English or French can easily get access to information about 
social welfare. Bertrand et al. (2000) find that access to a same-language network is 
positively related to welfare participation. Eligibility for social assistance can be treated 
as an increase in non-labour income and therefore as a disincentive of labour force 
participation.  
In terms of the likelihood of being employed, immigrants, specifically the most 
recent arrival cohorts, actually benefit from living in ethnic enclaves. All the probit 
regression results suggest that immigrants in a large enclave have a higher employment   24
probability than those living outside by 1 to 2 percentage points, which can be interpreted 
as a substantial impact on the unemployment rate. Considering the aforementioned 
human capital investment by enclave residents, the higher employment probability may 
be the reward to their newly acquired Canadian education or training. Moreover, the 
positive effect of enclave residence on employment may be explained by job 
opportunities in ethnic companies. Immigrants who want to work but lack 
Canadian-specific skills may choose to work in ethnic firms. When the within-ethnicity 
competition turns keen with the increasing size of enclave, the average wage is driven 
down, and those not employed may then undertake training or education and become 
non-participants. In addition, labour market information provided by the ethnic network 
may help new immigrants obtain jobs in non-ethnic firms too. Balakrishnan and Hou 
(1999) argue that immigrants become more mobile between place of work and residence 
because of the growing urbanization. It is more and more likely for immigrants to live in 
enclaves to enjoy the low-cost ethnic goods and work outside ethnic segregation to earn 
higher wages. 
In summary, enclave residence slightly reduces the immigrant labour force 
participation rate, but increases their probability of employment. Both impacts are 
stronger for new immigrants than old arrival cohorts. For the majority of immigrants, 
there is no clear evidence that their labour force involvement is hurt by enclave residence. 
This partially address the question raised by Borjas (2000) and Warman (2007) as to why 
immigrants still choose to live in ethnic enclaves in spite of its negative impact on wage 
growth: the benefit of low training costs or job opportunities offered by enclaves may 
outweigh the loss in wages. Based on this, policies on immigrant labour market   25
assimilation should rather focus on raising wages than on improving employment 
opportunities.   26
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Figure 1 
Male Immigrant-Native Differences in Labour Force Participation Rate by Birth 























NOTES: The sample is restricted to male natives and immigrants aged 25–54. 
 
 
Figure 2   
Male Immigrant-Native Differences in Employment Rate by Birth Cohort over Age, 























NOTES: Same as Figure 1.  29
Figure 3   
Male Immigrant-Native Differences in Labour Force Participation Rate by 























NOTES: Same as Figure 1. 
 
 
Figure 4   
Male Immigrant-Native Differences in Employment Rate by Immigrant Arrival Cohort, Census 






















NOTES: Same as Figure 1.  1
Table 1   
Enclaves with the Highest Exposure Indices by Ethnicity and CMA, Census 2001 
 
    German Polish Portuguese Italian Chinese Indian Filipino  Arab  Korean Jamaican
Montreal -  -  -  2.09%  1.15% 1.05%  -  1.95%  -  - 
Ottawa - Hull  -  -  -  -  1.94% 1.24%  -  1.70%  -  - 
Toronto -  1.24%  1.88%  3.07%  6.58%  6.81%  1.97%  -  -  1.51% 
Hamilton -  1.33%  -  2.48%  -  1.28%  -  -  -  - 
St. Catharines & Niagara Falls -  -  - 3.10%  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Kitchener 1.69%  -  1.91%  -  -  1.78%  -  -  -  - 
London -  1.27%  1.24%  -  -  -  -  -  -  - 
Windsor -  -  -  3.06%  -  -  -  2.53%  -  - 
Winnipeg  1.30%  - - -  -  1.10%  2.74%  -  -  - 
Calgary  -  - - -  3.43%  2.48%  1.08%  -  -  - 
Edmonton  -  - - -  2.67%  2.00%  -  -  -  - 
Vancouver  -  - - -  12.98%  4.71%  1.97%  -  1.06%  - 
Victoria  -  - - -  1.84%  -  -  -  -  - 
 
NOTES: Enclave exposure index = number of immigrants with an ethnicity in a city / total population of the city   2
Table 2   
Distribution of Enclave Residence for Male Immigrants by Socio-Economic Characteristics, Census 1981 – 2001 
 
    1981 (n=14,118)  1986 (n=14,734)  1991 (n=24,936)  1996 (n=28,351)  2001 (n=30,309) 
Enclave Index Percentiles  Small Medium Large Small Medium Large Small Medium Large Small Medium Large Small Medium Large 
                               
YSM  >20  0.37  0.37    0.26  0.37  0.34 0.28    0.34    0.34 0.33    0.37  0.34 0.30    0.39  0.33 0.29 
YSM  11-20  0.28  0.40    0.32  0.30  0.34 0.35    0.32    0.34 0.35    0.34  0.34 0.31    0.36  0.34 0.30 
YSM  ≤ 10  0.22 0.42    0.36  0.32 0.38  0.30  0.33   0.34  0.33  0.27 0.37  0.37  0.27 0.34  0.39 
                               
Less than High School  0.29  0.37    0.34  0.31 0.29  0.40  0.33   0.31  0.36  0.34 0.32  0.34  0.37 0.30  0.33 
High  School  Graduates  0.32  0.41    0.28  0.35  0.37 0.28    0.34    0.35 0.32    0.33  0.36 0.31    0.34  0.34 0.32 
Some  Postsecondary  0.31  0.41    0.28  0.34  0.41 0.25    0.34    0.35 0.31    0.33  0.35 0.32    0.36  0.35 0.29 
Bachelor's  Degree  0.24  0.42    0.34  0.33  0.39 0.29    0.29    0.33 0.38    0.26  0.37 0.37    0.27  0.33 0.40 
Postgraduate 0.30  0.44    0.25  0.41 0.39  0.21  0.34   0.38  0.28  0.32 0.37  0.30  0.30 0.35  0.34 
                               
Mother Tongue is English or 
French  0.29  0.45    0.25  0.31  0.34 0.35    0.31    0.28 0.41    0.29  0.28 0.42    0.30  0.43 0.27 
Knowledge of English or French 
but Other Mother Tongue  0.31  0.38    0.31  0.35  0.36 0.30    0.34    0.35 0.31    0.33  0.37 0.30    0.34  0.32 0.34 
No Official Language  0.19  0.41    0.40  0.19 0.27  0.54  0.25   0.36  0.40  0.22 0.31  0.47  0.22 0.22  0.55 
 
NOTES: "Small" means enclaves with an exposure index at the lowest 1/3, while "Large" enclaves refer to those at the top 1/3. Value of each cell = 
immigrants of a socio-economic group that live in an enclave percentile range / total immigrants of the group. The sample is restricted to males aged 
25–54 with positive wages living in Ontario, Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia.  1
Table 3   















        
Employed  0.92   0.92   0.93   0.94   0.90  
Unemployed  0.03   0.03   0.03   0.03   0.04  
Not  in  Labour  Force  0.05   0.05   0.04   0.03   0.06  
Work  in  the  same  CSD  0.54   0.49   0.41   0.46   0.51  
Annual  Wages  ($)  32,041   31,570   30,680   38,891   33,244 
Annual  Earnings  ($)  36,213   35,490   33,026   42,001   36,690 
Age  39.95   39.13   38.61   39.32   37.15  
Married  0.82   0.83   0.85   0.81   0.77  
Visible  Minority  0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00   0.00  
Dwelling  Owned  0.74   0.70   0.73   0.67   0.69  
Same  CSD  in  5  years  0.73   0.70   0.74   0.64   0.73  
Observation  4,214   5,574   4,330   5,877   68,063 















        
Employed  0.87   0.87   0.90   0.91   0.87  
Unemployed  0.07   0.07   0.05   0.05   0.07  
Not  in  Labour  Force  0.05   0.06   0.06   0.04   0.06  
Work in the same CSD  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A  N/A 
Annual  Wages  ($)  29,529   29,201   28,740   38,163   30,889 
Annual  Earnings  ($)  32,821   32,251   31,233   41,227   33,661 
Age  40.29   39.89   39.32   40.02   36.90  
Married  0.82   0.81   0.83   0.79   0.74  
Visible  Minority  0.33   0.33   0.50   0.09   0.01  
Dwelling  Owned  0.70   0.65   0.77   0.69   0.67  
Same  CSD  in  5  years  0.75   0.74   0.80   0.72   0.77  
















        
Employed  0.84   0.83   0.86   0.90   0.86  
Unemployed  0.09   0.10   0.08   0.06   0.08  
Not  in  Labour  Force  0.07   0.07   0.06   0.04   0.06  
Work  in  the  same  CSD  0.56   0.48   0.40   0.45   0.50  
Annual  Wages  ($)  27,450   28,201   29,270   38,201   31,945 
Annual  Earnings  ($)  30,586   31,215   31,638   41,540   34,817 
Age  39.72   40.01   39.35   40.40   37.45  
Married  0.78   0.79   0.81   0.78   0.72  
Visible  Minority  0.44   0.40   0.67   0.17   0.01  
Dwelling  Owned  0.61   0.64   0.76   0.69   0.69  
Same  CSD  in  5  years  0.64   0.66   0.65   0.67   0.73  
Observation  8,227   8,433   8,276   8,911   129,191   2
Table 3 (concluded) 
















        
Employed  0.81   0.79   0.79   0.89   0.85  
Unemployed  0.09   0.10   0.07   0.05   0.07  
Not  in  Labour  Force  0.10   0.12   0.13   0.06   0.08  
Work  in  the  same  CSD  0.47   0.41   0.36   0.43   0.44  
Annual  Wages  ($)  24,392   23,017   23,186   35,722   29,776 
Annual  Earnings  ($)  26,942   25,205   25,245   38,950   32,272 
Age  40.48   39.78   39.61   41.48   38.59  
Married  0.76   0.76   0.77   0.75   0.69  
Visible  Minority  0.43   0.51   0.83   0.09   0.01  
Dwelling  Owned  0.60   0.56   0.71   0.70   0.69  
Same  CSD  in  5  years  0.72   0.72   0.67   0.72   0.77  
















        
Employed  0.83   0.83   0.83   0.88   0.87  
Unemployed  0.07   0.06   0.05   0.04   0.05  
Not  in  Labour  Force  0.11   0.10   0.12   0.08   0.08  
Work  in  the  same  CSD  0.51   0.50   0.49   0.49   0.47  
Annual  Wages  ($)  26,310   27,014   26,481   37,054   33,086 
Annual  Earnings  ($)  29,238   29,448   28,738   40,648   35,769 
Age  41.01   40.35   40.44   41.76   39.56  
Married  0.75   0.75   0.81   0.73   0.68  
Visible  Minority  0.51   0.59   0.85   0.14   0.02  
Dwelling  Owned  0.60   0.57   0.71   0.70   0.71  
Same  CSD  in  5  years  0.73   0.71   0.69   0.74   0.79  
Observation  10,105   10,130   10,074   6,082   126,726 
 
NOTES: Each cell presents the weighted average of an enclave group. The sample is restricted to 
males aged 25–54 with positive wages living in Ontario, Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, 
British Columbia.   3
Table 4   
Probit Regressions of Male Immigrant Labour Force Participation: Marginal 
Effects of Enclave Exposure Index 
 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Census 1981  1986  1991  1996  2001 
          
Regressions with No Interaction 
 
Enclave Index  0.081  0.092  0.149  -0.436***  -0.346*** 
 (0.068)  (0.114)  (0.155)  (0.090)  (0.128) 
          
Pseudo R
2 0.05  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.05 
          
Regressions with Enclave Index Interacted with YSM Group 
 
Enclave Index * YSM>20  -0.048  -0.051  0.237  -0.000  0.015 
 (0.131)  (0.202)  (0.185)  (0.270)  (0.120) 
Enclave Index * YSM 11-20  0.156  -0.123  0.496***  -0.085  -0.166** 
 (0.103)  (0.114)  (0.134)  (0.124)  (0.081) 
Enclave Index * YSM<10  0.122  0.632***  -0.069  -0.653***  -0.528** 
 (0.107)  (0.175)  (0.275)  (0.158)  (0.211) 
          
Pseudo R
2 0.05  0.05  0.06  0.06  0.05 
Observations 14,893  15,348 27,496  29,709  30,997 
 
NOTES: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by * for 10%, ** 
for 5%, and *** for 1 %. The dependent variable is the dummy indicating whether an individual 
participates in the labour force (employed or unemployed). Regressions control for 
years-since-migration, age group, educational attainment, knowledge of official languages, marital 
status, visible minority status and province of residence. The sample is restricted to males aged 25–54 
living in Ontario, Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia. 
   4
Table 5   
Probit Regressions of Male Immigrant Labour Force Participation: Marginal 
Effects of Large Enclave Dummy 
 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Census 1981  1986  1991  1996  2001 
          
Regressions with No Interaction 
          
Large Enclave Dummy  0.003  0.004  0.011**  -0.011  -0.008 
 (0.004)  (0.004)  (0.005)  (0.008)  (0.008) 
          
Pseudo R
2 0.05  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.05 
          
Regressions with Large Enclave Dummy Interacted with YSM Group 
          
Large Enclave * YSM>20  -0.000  -0.002  0.007  -0.018*  0.003 
 (0.006)  (0.007)  (0.005)  (0.010)  (0.007) 
Large Enclave * YSM 11-20  0.008*  -0.000  0.016***  -0.010  -0.010 
 (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.007) 
Large Enclave * YSM<10  0.002  0.017***  0.011  -0.007  -0.015 
 (0.008)  (0.005)  (0.009)  (0.017)  (0.019) 
          
Pseudo R
2 0.05  0.05  0.06  0.05  0.05 
Observations 14,893  15,348 27,496  29,709  30,997 
 
NOTES: Same as Table 4   5
Table 6   
Probit Regressions of Male Immigrant Employment: Marginal Effects of Enclave 
Exposure Index 
  (1) (2)  (3)  (4)  (5) 
Census 1981  1986  1991  1996  2001 
          
Regressions with No Interaction 
          
Enclave Index  0.090  0.451***  0.596***  0.375***  0.183*** 
 (0.055)  (0.151)  (0.168)  (0.104)  (0.056) 
          
Pseudo R
2 0.05  0.06  0.05  0.06  0.05 
          
Regressions with Enclave Index Interacted with YSM Group 
          
Enclave Index * YSM>20  -0.012  0.298  0.204  0.136  0.063 
 (0.132)  (0.247)  (0.246)  (0.151)  (0.078) 
Enclave Index * YSM 11-20  0.111  0.428**  0.419*  0.409***  0.178*** 
 (0.133)  (0.187)  (0.236)  (0.115)  (0.064) 
Enclave Index * YSM<10  0.135  0.659***  0.976***  0.443**  0.226*** 
 (0.095)  (0.250)  (0.191)  (0.174)  (0.078) 
          
Pseudo R
2 0.05  0.06  0.05  0.06  0.05 
Observations 14,220  14,500 25,613  26,199  27,536 
NOTES: Robust standard errors are in parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by * for 10%, ** 
for 5%, and *** for 1 %. The dependent variable is the dummy indicating whether an individual is 
employed. Regressions control for years-since-migration, age group, educational attainment, 
knowledge of official languages, marital status, visible minority status and province of residence. The 
sample is restricted to male labour force participants (employed or unemployed) aged 25–54 living in 
Ontario, Quebec, Manitoba, Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia. 
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Table 7   
Probit Regressions of Male Immigrant Employment: Marginal Effects of Large 
Enclave Dummy 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
Census  1981 1986 1991 1996 2001 
       
Regressions with No Interaction 
       
Large  Enclave  Dummy  0.006**  0.020*** 0.017*** 0.018***  0.011** 
  (0.003) (0.004) (0.006) (0.006) (0.004) 
       
Pseudo R
2  0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 
       
Regressions with Large Enclave Dummy Interacted with YSM Group 
       
Large  Enclave  *  YSM>20  -0.003 0.011 0.006 0.003 0.000 
  (0.006) (0.007) (0.007) (0.006) (0.006) 
Large Enclave * YSM 11-20  0.004  0.019***  0.009  0.011  0.013** 
  (0.006) (0.006) (0.008) (0.010) (0.005) 
Large  Enclave  *  YSM<10  0.012*** 0.026*** 0.029*** 0.028***  0.015** 
  (0.004) (0.006) (0.008) (0.007) (0.006) 
       
Pseudo R
2  0.05 0.06 0.05 0.06 0.05 
Observations 14,220  14,500 25,613 26,199 27,536 
NOTES: Same as Table 6.   7
Table 8   
IV Probit Regressions of Male Immigrant Labour Force Participation: Marginal 
Effects of Enclave Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Census  1986 1991 1996 2001 
      
Enclave Exposure Index  -0.037  0.139  -0.444***  -0.394*** 
 (0.124)  (0.198)  (0.094) (0.123) 
      
Rho
4  0.004 -0.006 0.006 0.006 
      
Large Enclave Dummy  0.001  0.009  -0.028***  -0.031** 
 (0.008)  (0.008)  (0.010) (0.014) 
      
Rho -0.024  0.017  0.055***  0.081*** 
Observations  10,826 21,895 27,411 29,991 
NOTES: Results from the second stage regressions are presented. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1 %. The 
dependent variable is the dummy indicating whether an individual participates in the labour force 
(employed or unemployed). Regressions control for years-since-migration, age group, educational 
attainment, knowledge of official languages, marital status, visible minority status and province of 
residence. The sample is restricted to males aged 25–54 living in Ontario, Quebec, Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia. 
                                                        
4  Rho measures the correlation between the errors in the probit equation and the reduced-form equation for the 
endogenous regressor. A rho that is significantly different from zero means one should reject the null hypothesis that 
there is no endogeneity issue and verifies the use of IV.   8
Table 9   
IV Probit Regressions of Male Immigrant Employment: Marginal Effects of Enclave 
Variables 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) 
Census  1986 1991 1996 2001 
      
Enclave Exposure Index  0.395**  0.592***  0.373***  0.153** 
 (0.193)  (0.189)  (0.107) (0.060) 
      
Rho -0.010  -0.016  -0.041***  0.018* 
      
Large  Enclave  Dummy  0.032*** 0.023** 0.019*** 0.013** 
 (0.009)  (0.010)  (0.007) (0.006) 
      
Rho -0.077**  -0.048**  -0.022  -0.014 
Observations  10,265 20,441 24,187 26,652 
NOTES: Results from the second stage regressions are presented. Robust standard errors are in 
parentheses. Significance levels are indicated by * for 10%, ** for 5%, and *** for 1 %. The 
dependent variable is the dummy indicating whether an individual is employed. Regressions control 
for years-since-migration, age group, educational attainment, knowledge of official languages, marital 
status, visible minority status and province of residence. The sample is restricted to male labour force 
participants (employed or unemployed) aged 25–54 living in Ontario, Quebec, Manitoba, 
Saskatchewan, Alberta, British Columbia. 
 
 